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ABSTRACT
While social interactions are critical to understanding consumer be-
havior, the relationship between social and commerce networks has
not been explored on a large scale. We analyze Taobao, a Chinese
consumer marketplace that is the world’s largest e-commerce web-
site. What sets Taobao apart from its competitors is its integrated
instant messaging tool, which buyers can use to ask sellers about
products or ask other buyers for advice. In our study, we focus on
how an individual’s commercial transactions are embedded in their
social graphs. By studying triads and the directed closure process,
we quantify the presence of information passing and gain insights
into when different types of links form in the network.
Using seller ratings and review information, we then quantify a
price of trust. How much will a consumer pay for transaction with
a trusted seller? We conclude by modeling this consumer choice
problem: if a buyer wishes to purchase a particular product, how
does (s)he decide which store to purchase it from? By analyzing
the performance of various feature sets in an information retrieval
setting, we demonstrate how the social graph factors into under-
standing consumer behavior.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: H.2.8 Database Manage-
ment: Database Applications – Data mining
General Terms: Measurement; Experimentation.
Keywords: E-Commerce, Viral Marketing, Recommender Sys-
tems, Triadic Closure, Price of Trust.
1. INTRODUCTION
Use of personal social networks to gather information is fun-
damental to purchasing behavior [6]. It is something so common
in our daily routine that we usually do not even make a note of
it. When we make a purchase from a retail store, we often speak
beforehand to the shopkeeper about suitable products. When we
need to purchase something we are unfamiliar with, we consult our
friends and family for advice. When we purchase a popular new
product, we have an urge to tell everyone we know about it.
Although personal social networks are implicit in the offline shop-
ping experience, their introduction to the online world is a relatively
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new phenomenon. E-commerce websites, such as Amazon, eBay
and Epinions, have successfully integrated product reviews, rec-
ommendations, search and product comparison, but they have been
much slower at adopting social networking features as a part of
customer experience. Recommendation engines and product com-
parison sites help consumers discover new products and receive
more accurate evaluations, however they cannot completely sub-
stitute for the personalized recommendations and information that
one receives from a friend or relative. Basic behavioral psychol-
ogy drives consumers to value and trust their friends’ purchasing
decisions more than anonymous opinions. For example, a Lucid
Marketing survey found that 68% of individuals consulted friends
and relatives before purchasing home electronics [3].
Understanding how social networks are used and how they shape
purchasing decisions is one of the fundamental interests of e-commerce.
Only recently have social networks been used in e-commerce ap-
plications to some success. For example, group purchasing compa-
nies such as Groupon and LivingSocial allow consumers to come
together to buy products in bulk and save money, while social shop-
ping sites such as Kaboodle provide consumers the ability to share
shopping lists with each other. The use of social networks in online
shopping provides marketers and businesses with new revenue op-
portunities, while providing consumers with product information
and both economic and social rewards for sharing [11].
Present work. When discussing the relationship between elec-
tronic commerce and social networks, various questions come to
mind. How do friends influence consumer purchasing decisions
and product adoption? What factors influence the success of word-
of-mouth product recommendations? How does social influence
and reputation affect commercial activity? In this paper, we will ad-
dress these questions through a detailed study of the world’s largest
e-commerce website Taobao.
The fundamental process we focus upon throughout this study is
what we term information passing: an individual purchases a prod-
uct, then messages a friend, what is the likelihood that the friend
will then purchase the product? Where will he purchase it from?
Understanding the flow of social influence in commerce networks
is an important question. For example, information passing pro-
vides insight into how companies can structure online viral market-
ing campaigns to target consumers. It can also be used to optimize
algorithms within product recommendation engines. However im-
portant information passing is to electronic commerce, it still has
not been well studied on a large scale due to the inaccessibility of
suitable data.
To facilitate our research, we obtained a dataset describing the
behavior of one million users in the world’s largest e-commerce
network Taobao. Taobao connects buyers and sellers, and pro-
vides an integrated instant messaging platform for communication
among all its users. By modeling Taobao as a network of three
types of edges (trades, messages, contacts), we are able to directly
study how social communication and commercial transactions are
interrelated in an online setting. Our study provides insights into
three main aspects of the social-commercial relationship: informa-
tion passing, the price of trust, and consumer choice prediction.
We begin our study of social commerce by quantifying the pres-
ence of information passing through analysis of triadic closure pro-
cesses. We show that the influence of information passing is di-
rectly proportional to message strength, and is inversely propor-
tional to product price, as well as the time between the purchase
and the recommendation. Additionally, we explain how informa-
tion passing varies greatly between different product categories.
We then investigate the general edge formation process in the con-
text of directed triadic closure, and demonstrate that the forma-
tion of triad-closing message and trade edges is highly dependent
upon user roles (buyer or seller). Our results indicate that informa-
tion passing via buyer-buyer communication is one of the primary
drivers of purchasing.
A subtle point regarding information passing is that the spread
of product recommendations, through word-of-mouth, inherently
relies upon a notion of buyer-buyer trust. Trust, from the perspec-
tive of social psychology, can be defined as perceived credibility
or benevolence to the target [7]. In the context of electronic mar-
ketplaces, buyer-seller trust, most directly encapsulated by seller
reputations and ratings, are the natural concept to study. A funda-
mental idea behind the nature of trust is its price. How much extra
will a buyer pay for transaction security with a highly-rated seller?
Although an intuitive idea, initial studies did not find evidence for
a price of trust [25], and only recently has a price of trust been es-
tablished in small, controlled, and single product settings [26, 13,
23]. In our study, we analyze transaction information across over
10,000 products. Using the overall customer satisfaction (i.e., aver-
age rating) of the seller, we observe a small but super-linear effect
of the seller rating upon the price premium they can charge and still
engage in transactions.
To further study the relationship between social networks and
consumer behavior, we then consider the question, “How does an
online consumer decide upon a seller to purchase from when there
are many sellers offering the same product?” We model this ques-
tion of consumer choice through a machine learning task and pre-
dict which particular seller a buyer will purchase from, given that
the sellers all offer the same relevant product. Utilizing primarily
social networking features, we construct a model that can predict,
for the case of a buyer choosing from among 10 possible sellers, the
correct seller 42% of the time, approximately 4 times better than
baseline. We also contrast a variety of feature sets (both graph-
based and product/seller metadata), and demonstrate that the social
graph is the most important feature in predicting consumer choice.
In particular, the social graph is a far better determinant of con-
sumer behavior than metadata features such as seller reputation or
product price. Our results nicely connect to Granovetter’s work,
which argues that economic transactions are embedded in dynamic
social networks, and that an individual’s social graph dictates how
they choose sellers to transact with [10].
Further Related Work. For all of the importance of social net-
works in consumer shopping, though, their use in electronic com-
merce still is not well understood. Previous research examined the
use of social networks in e-commerce, but has mostly focused upon
one aspect of the use of social networks, such as product recom-
mendations [12, 17, 2], product recommendation engines [29, 28],
or have been based upon a limited set of data [4, 15].
Network Nodes Edges Avg Deg Avg CCF
Contact 663,346 3,208,043 9.67 0.0135
Message 750,158 3,908,339 5.21 0.0194
Trade 1,000,000 1,337,497 1.34 0.0086
Table 1: Dataset statistics.
The electronic marketplace eBay is perhaps the most well stud-
ied e-commerce website. Various aspects of eBay including auc-
tion efficiency [14], product recommendations [31], seller strate-
gies [8], and summarization [22], have been studied. Closely re-
lated to our work on consumer choice prediction, Wu and Bolivar
created a model to predict item purchase probability [30]. The pri-
mary difference here is that we utilize the social networks of the
buyers and sellers, along with product and user metadata, to per-
form consumer choice prediction, whereas they consider only seller
and product information.
Our study of information passing and triadic closure builds upon
classical works by Rapoport [24] and Granovetter [9]. Triadic clo-
sure has been explored in various settings: community growth [1],
link prediction [21], signed networks [19], and social [18] and in-
formation [27] network evolution. In contrast, we demonstrate the
existence of implicit recommendation behavior in a network not
specifically designed for information passing.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we describe the
Taobao dataset. In section 3, we analyze dyadic relationships in the
network. In section 4, we provide a detailed analysis of information
passing and directed triadic closure processes. In section 5, we
quantify a price for trust. And last, in section 6, we model the
consumer choice prediction problem.
2. TAOBAO NETWORK
The data we use in this study comes from the Chinese web-
site Taobao, one of the world’s largest electronic marketplaces,
with over 370 million registered users at the end of 2010. Al-
though transactions on Taobao can be either business-to-consumer,
business-to-business, or consumer-to-consumer, the bulk of the prod-
ucts are sold by online storefronts operated by small businesses or
individuals. Perhaps the most unique aspect of Taobao is its inte-
grated in-browser instant messaging platform, which allows us to
correlate users’ communication patterns and purchasing behavior.
Any user can purchase goods from other users, add other users onto
their contact list, and message other users. Note that non-contacts
can message each other as well.
Our data is composed of all activities of the set of the first one
million users that engaged in at least one commercial transaction
during September 1 through October 28, 2009. For each of these
users, we have all information regarding their transactions with
other users in the set, where a transaction is specified by a prod-
uct identifier, price, quantity, and timestamp. We also obtained the
contact lists and timestamps of messages exchanged between these
users during the two month observation period. Note that we do
not have the contents of the messages exchanged.
We model the Taobao network as a multigraph composed of di-
rected trade edges, directed message edges, and undirected con-
tact/friendship edges.1 Table 1 shows the basic statistics of the
Taobao network when each edge type is viewed as a separate net-
work. The 3,908,339 directed message edges are equivalent to
1The multigraph is modeled such that if there are multiple trades
or messages from one user to another, we aggregate it all into a
single directed edge, with supplementary message and trade infor-
mation being associated with that edge. There can be up to 5 edges
between a pair of users (2 directed trades, 2 directed messages, 1
undirected contact).
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Figure 1: Trade Volume versus Message Volume. Message is
computed over all pairs of users that exchange at least one mes-
sage. Message+Trade is computed over all pairs of users that
exchange at least one message and one trade.
 20
 25
 30
 35
 40
 45
 50
100 101 102 103 104 105
M
es
sa
ge
s 
on
 T
ra
de
 D
ay
Price
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
 0
 0.5
 1
 1.5
 2
 2.5
-6 -4 -2  0  2  4  6
Lo
g 
M
es
sa
ge
s
Days Relative to Trade
Figure 2: Buyer-Seller Messages vs. Transaction Price (left),
relative to Trade Date (right).
2,241,729 undirected message edges, as messages are often recip-
rocated during discourse between a pair of users. In contrast, the
1,337,497 directed trade edges are equivalent to 1,336,502 undi-
rected trade edges, as purchases are almost never reciprocated.
Throughout the rest of this paper, when we refer to a node as a
“buyer” or “seller,” we are speaking about its role in a particular
transaction. Thus, we do not a priori label the nodes as buyers or
sellers, but we use these terms to aid explanation. As a point of
reference, 968,149 users make at least one purchase, 69,494 users
make at least one sale, and 37,643 users make both a purchase and
sale during the observation period. The products purchased and
sold by these users are classified by Taobao into 82 categories.
3. DYADIC RELATIONSHIPS
To facilitate our goal of understanding how commercial transac-
tions are embedded in the social networks of buyers and sellers, we
first examine dyadic relationships in Taobao. In particular, we are
interested in determining if messaging activity is correlated with
trading activity. We graph trade volume versus message volume
across pairs of users in Figure 1, and find that there is a positive in-
creasing relationship between message volume and trade volume.
Ignoring all pairs of users that only message and do not trade, we
see an even more pronounced increasing relationship, displayed in
the Message+Trade curve. The positive correlation between mes-
saging and trading activity across dyads is supportive of our hy-
pothesis that commercial activity is embedded in social networks.
We will investigate the relationship between communication and
commerce in much greater detail in our study of triadic structures.
Focusing upon the subset of dyads between pairs of users who
have historically transacted, our question of interest is, “Do buy-
ers talk to sellers more about expensive products?” We expect that
expensive products are talked about more, but how much more are
they talked about? To answer this question, we count the number
of messages sent from buyer to seller on transaction date, assuming
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Figure 3: Given that B1 first purchased from S1 and then
talked to B2, will B2 purchase from S1? (left) and Mutual Con-
tacts (right).
that at least one message is exchanged, and plot it versus product
price (in Chinese Yuan, CNY), displayed in Figure 2(left). We find
that the number of messages sent is relatively constant for products
of price below 100 CNY, then increases logarithmically for prod-
ucts of higher price. This relationship can be explained by messag-
ing being one of the primary tools in Taobao through which a buyer
can minimize transaction risk.
In order to minimize transaction risk, one would expect that buy-
ers speak to sellers often before transaction to inquire about prod-
uct details. How often do buyers speak to sellers before and after
trades? We graph the number of buyer-seller messages versus trade
date in Figure 2(right). As expected, most messages occur on the
day of transaction, likely being product negotiation. What we find
particularly interesting is that post-trade messages are significantly
more common than pre-trade messages. In the Taobao system, buy-
ers have an option of using an escrow service, where the seller first
ships the product, and payment is exchanged after the buyer exam-
ines the product. The observed post-trade messages are likely dis-
cussion regarding product satisfaction and payment confirmation.
4. INFORMATION PASSING
From our study of dyadic buyer-seller relationships, we learn that
messaging activity is correlated with trading activity across pairs of
users. However, dyadic relationships are only the tip of the iceberg
when thinking about the interplay between communication and pur-
chasing decisions in a social commerce network. Imagine the fol-
lowing situation: a buyer notices a deal offered at an electronic
store, makes a purchase, then messages his friend about the deal.
Will the friend also make a purchase from the same store? How
large is the influence of the buyer?
We quantify and investigate this economic diffusion behavior
which we term information passing, illustrated in Figure 3(left).
More formally, if buyer B1 purchases from seller S1 and then talks
to user B2, will user B2 then purchase from seller S1 as well?2 In
the subsequent sections, we analyze information passing through
the study of (1) local mutual neighborhoods in static networks, (2)
information passing in dynamic networks, (3) influences upon in-
formation passing, and (4) directed triadic closure.
Information Passing and Triadic Closure. We begin our study
of information passing by examining local neighborhoods in each
edge type network (trade, message, contact) of a static endtime
snapshot of Taobao. We are interested in understanding how the
mutual relationships in one static network are correlated with the
edge likelihood in another static network. Of particular interest is
2Again, we assign buyer and seller roles with respect to particular
transactions. So user B2 can be a seller and user S1 can be a buyer
in some other transactions.
the question of how social proximity is correlated with trade likeli-
hood between a pair of users, where social proximity is measured
by the number of mutual contacts between the pair. If we demon-
strate that there is correlation between social proximity and trade
likelihood, then information passing processes, as shown in Fig-
ure 3(left), are likely present in Taobao.
We find that the more mutual contacts a pair of users has, the
greater the likelihood that they engaged in a commercial trans-
action, labeled as Standard in Figure 3(right). If we restrict our
attention to only users who have exchanged at least one message
(Msg Req), then for a given number of mutual contacts, the trans-
action probability is noticeably greater than before.3 From these
results, we can infer that trades are more likely to be embedded
in the dense subgraphs of communication networks. This implies
that social proximity and trade likelihood are correlated, and are a
signal that information passing and product recommendation may
be present in the Taobao network. In general, a direct relationship
in one network is not only embedded in the local neighborhood of
that relationship, but is also positioned in the context of networks
with other edge types. This suggests that edges in one network can
be used to help understand the link formation process in another.
Building on this idea, we next perform a similar experiment in a
dynamic triadic closure setting.
Information Passing. Following our examination of the static net-
work, we study network relationships in the dynamic network. In
particular, we look at how the message and contact networks influ-
ence the trade network by checking for the presence of information
passing, as displayed in Figure 3(left).
To quantify information passing in the Taobao network, we mea-
sure the information passing success rate of the network, which we
define as Prob(B2 buys from S1 at t2 +∆ | B1 buys from S1 at t1
and B1 messages B2 at t2, t2 > t1).4
Before computing the information passing success rate for the
Taobao network, we require a random baseline for comparison. For
our baseline, we compute the information passing success rate of
an edge-rewired version of the Taobao network, where the edge-
rewired network is constructed by randomly rewiring all 3 types of
edges in the original network, while leaving node degrees and edge
creation times unchanged.
We compute the information passing success rate over 3,906,354
node pair instances in the original network and observe a probabil-
ity of 0.00203. In contrast, the information passing success rate
of the rewired network is computed to be 0.00006. The observed
probability of recommendation success is two orders of magnitude
more likely than the random baseline, implying that information
passing in Taobao is statistically significant and non-random.
Having verified the presence of information passing by checking
for edge formation in the forward direction, we confirm the pres-
ence of information passing in the reverse direction. Suppose that
B1 buys from S1 at time t1 and B2 buys from the same S1 at time
t1+δ, we measure the number of messages exchanged between B1
and B2 in the time intervals Before [t1−δ,t1], Between [t1,t1+δ],
and After [t1 + δ, t1 + 2δ] the purchases of B1 and B2. One
expects that if information passing is present, then most messages
exchanged betweeen the two buyers occur after B1 purchases, but
before B2 purchases. Table 2 shows the messages for the 3 time pe-
3To compare, the likelihood that a pair of direct contacts have trans-
acted historically is 0.089.
4We only consider the time t2 corresponding to the first message
from B1 to B2 after t1. We also add a requirement of ∆ ≤ 2
days, i.e.,B2 makes a purchase soon after talking toB1, to dampen
the effects of regular purchases that occur irrelevant to messaging
behavior.
Days between purchases Before Between After
1 4.16 5.29 4.76
2 7.78 14.29 7.76
3 8.60 10.52 7.44
4 7.34 15.90 10.79
5 21.87 30.70 21.18
Table 2: Messages between two buyers relative to their trade
dates with the same seller.
riods versus δ, averaged over all instances. We see that the largest
proportion of messages exchanged between the buyers occur be-
tween their corresponding trade dates. For example, when the buy-
ers transact two days apart, twice as many messages are exchanged
Between the purchase dates, as compared to Before or After. Since
messages exchanged Between are more likely to be recommenda-
tions, this is additional evidence that information passing is present
in the Taobao network.
Through examination of both forward and backward processes,
we demonstrate that information passing is present in the Taobao
network. In particular, we show that the observed information
passing success rate is two orders of magnitude more likely than
a random baseline. Prior studies providing evidence of information
passing have been primarily conducted in product recommendation
networks [17]. Our work shows that information passing, involv-
ing both buyer-buyer and buyer-seller relationships, occurs implic-
itly in Taobao, where the communication tool is primarily intended
for buyer-seller communication. This result is significant because
it illustrates how offline consumer behavior, asking or informing a
personal social network about products, is also manifested implic-
itly in online social commerce networks.
Influences upon Information Passing. Having demonstrated the
existence of information passing in the Taobao network, the next
question is, “What factors influence the success rate of information
passing?” In the following experiments, we examine how informa-
tion passing success varies with respect to 4 variables: communica-
tion strength, time difference, product price, and product category.
Perhaps the primary influence upon the success of information
passing is the amount of communication between the initial buyer,
B1, and his messaging partner, B2. One can hypothesize that the
stronger the communication between the two users, the more likely
that B2 will also purchase the product from the seller that sold to
B1. Counting the number of messages exchanged within time win-
dow [t1− δ, t1+ δ], the Standard curve of Figure 4(left) shows the
probability of closure with δ = 3 days. As expected, the stronger
the communication between the two users, the more likely that B2
will be influenced by B1. Adding a requirement to consider only
users B2 who have never purchased from S1 historically (FirstBuy
Req), we get a slightly lower, but still similar likelihood curve.
Note that an alternative possible explanation for these findings
is that both B1 and B2 are active users in Taobao who commu-
nicate with other users frequently, make more purchases, and are
thus more likely to purchase from the same sellers. However, we
demonstrate this hypothesis is incorrect by performing an experi-
ment where we keep the communication network and the number
of purchases of a buyer unchanged, but randomize the sellers (i.e.,
buyers buy from random sellers). We find that the increased com-
munication between the two users does not correlate with the in-
formation passing success rate (Random curve of Figure 4(left)),
meaning that the stronger the communication, the stronger the ef-
fect of information passing.
The results from this experiment lead to several observations.
First, messaging generally increases purchasing behavior in the
Taobao network. Second, information passing is present in the net-
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Figure 4: Triadic Closure Probability given Message Strength (left), Time Difference in Days (middle), and Price in CNY (right).
work. Additionally, communication leads to purchases, and social
network structure provides a surprisingly strong signal indicating
which seller a buyer will purchase from. This latter result will be
quite useful later when we study consumer choice prediction.
In addition to counting the number of messages exchanged be-
tween buyers, one should also consider the time difference, t2− t1,
between the initial trade and message from B1 to B2. We expect
that the larger the time difference between the initial purchase and
message, the lower the influence of the message upon the purchas-
ing behavior of B2. As shown in Figure 4(middle), the probability
of information passing success steadily decreases with time. We
observe the same effect regardless of whether we require the trade
(B2, S1) to be a first time trade (FirstBuy Req) or any trade (Stan-
dard). This implies that social product recommendation and influ-
ence spreading is most effective when utilized immediately after
initial product adoption or purchase.
Although communication between B1 and B2 is a significant in-
fluence upon information passing, the characteristics of the product
itself also affect the success of information passing. We can imag-
ine that the most important product attribute to consider is the price
(in Chinese Yuan, CNY) of the initial purchase. As displayed in
Figure 4(right), we find that the information passing success rate
decreases with product price for the price range from 1 CNY to
15 CNY, then increases slightly for products priced above 15 CNY.
The large closure probability at a price of 1 CNY is due to the pop-
ularity and virality of virtual goods, such as game credits.
In addition to product price, we also consider the category of the
product itself when measuring the information passing success rate.
We find that a few categories exhibit recommendation success rates
much higher than other categories, while many categories exhibit
nearly no information passing at all. For example, the category
women’s clothing exhibits a success rate of over 20%, while the
category home decorations exhibits a success rate of 1.47%. A
major possible influence for the variability of these numbers are the
regular group-purchasing deals offered by large stores on Taobao,
which provide financial incentives for consumers to convince their
friends to join them in purchases.
In summary, our experiments demonstrate that the success of in-
formation passing is directly proportional to the communication
strength between the initial buyer and their message partner, in-
versely proportional to the time difference between the purchase
and initial recommendation, inversely proportional to product price,
and highly category specific. It is clear that influencing an individ-
ual to purchase a product is a complex affair. We believe these
results are informative and can provide guidance to viral marketing
campaigns when trying to promote product recommendation and
adoption among online users.
Directed Triadic Closure. Our previous study of local information
passing processes can be seen as a special case of the more general
directed triadic closure problem. We next investigate the process of
directed triadic closure on a global scale. In the following study, we
answer various questions regarding triadic closure including: What
types of triads are more likely to be formed? What types of edges
are more likely to close triads?
For our task, we focus upon the link formation process in the
context of triadic closure for the message and trade networks. In
particular, consider a triple of nodes U,X, V , where first pairsU,X
and V,X interact via messaging or trading, and then a triangle clos-
ing edge U → V or V → U forms. We are interested in how the
type of interaction (message vs. trade) and the direction of inter-
action (i.e., U → X vs. X → U ) affects the formation of the
triad-closing edge between U and V .
Let us define a Directed Configuration Set (U; X; V) as a situ-
ation where an edge forms between U and X at time t1, then an
edge forms between V and X at time t2 (t2>t1). We are interested
in the probability that a triad-closing edge forms between nodes U
and V at a time t3 (t3>t2). There are 16 possible Directed Con-
figuration Sets, displayed in the first column of Table 3: the left
node represents U , middle node X and right node V . For the triad-
closing edge, we use the following shorthand notation: mi is the
message edge (V,U), while mo is the message edge in the oppo-
site direction (U,V). Similarly, ti is the trade edge (V,U), while to
denotes the trade edge in the opposite direction (U,V). We use the
term instance to refer to a particular example of a configuration set.
Now in Table 3, we examine various properties of configuration
sets. In particular, we are interested in knowing, “How many times
does a particular configuration set get closed with a third edge?
And what is the type of that edge?” For easier reasoning about var-
ious configuration sets, we denote hypothetical buyer/seller desig-
nations for the middle node X in the last column of Table 3. For
example, if the configuration contains a purchase by X and no sale,
then we say that X has a “buyer” role. Similarly, if the configura-
tion contains a sale by X and no purchase, then we say that X has a
“seller” role. In all other cases, the role of X is ambiguous.
To begin our study of directed triadic closure, first observe that
there is little brokerage or reselling in the network, as the two
configurations where X both “buys” and “sells” have the lowest
unique node X as well as instance counts (Columns # Uniq. X, #
Instances). This is indicative of the general bipartite structure of
Taobao, where users primarily take on either buyer or seller roles.
Another important observation is that configurations where X has
a “seller” role are represented approximately 100 times more often
than configurations where X has a “buyer” role. The number of
unique buyers exceeds the number of unique sellers in these con-
figurations, as shown in Column # Uniq. X, implying that activity
levels for sellers are much higher than those for buyers. The large
difference in activity levels is likely due to how individuals actu-
ally use Taobao. Buyers browse Taobao casually and interact with
others primarily when interested, whereas sellers spend their day
speaking with potential clients. Given the bipartiteness of Taobao
and the general activity level of sellers, we can imagine that seller
nodes are local “star” structures in the Taobao graph.
Dir. Config Set # Instances # Uniq. X P(close) P(t|close) P(m|close) s(to) s(ti) X “role”
590,635 235,088 0.4146 0.4027 0.5973 69.19 63.39 B
469,755 28,046 0.3925 0.3295 0.6705 3.09 16.87
410,951 27,302 0.3319 0.3636 0.6364 18.75 6.13
516,941,038 45,741 0.0018 0.1242 0.8758 -18.11 -18.30 S
2,661,874 382,690 0.5034 0.3191 0.6809 41.26 101.61 B
2,738,167 428,334 0.5470 0.3220 0.6780 41.94 118.83 B
253,840,924 45,318 0.0048 0.1308 0.8692 -9.28 -5.40 S
252,983,480 45,931 0.0050 0.1299 0.8701 -9.26 -5.03 S
3,106,078 421,888 0.5103 0.3309 0.6691 126.17 61.89 B
276,047,807 46,475 0.0070 0.1595 0.8405 -0.59 2.09 S
3,174,237 475,074 0.5019 0.3324 0.6676 141.02 65.23 B
272,424,037 47,524 0.0070 0.1598 0.8402 -0.04 2.63 S
420,018,116 403,220 0.0289 0.1386 0.8614 52.92 63.96
280,943,201 436,865 0.0458 0.1369 0.8631 56.03 75.16
276,848,803 442,548 0.0438 0.1409 0.8591 67.61 70.19
272,535,699 469,549 0.0467 0.1398 0.8602 68.69 80.00
Table 3: Directed Configuration Set (U; X; V), where X is the middle node, U is the left node, V is the right node. # Instances =
number of instances. # Uniq. X = number of unique X nodes over all instances. P(close) = 100 * probability of a triad-closing third
edge. P(t|close) = proportion of triads closed by a trade. P(m|close) = proportion of triads closed by a message. s(to) = surprise for
directed trade edge (U, V). s(ti) = surprise for directed trade edge (V, U). X “role” = hypothesized role of X.
Following our comparison of configuration instance counts, we
consider the question, “When will an instance of a Directed Con-
figuration Set be closed by a third edge?” We compute the proba-
bility of the configuration (U; X; V) being closed by an edge (U,V).
Observe that configurations where X is a buyer have much higher
closure probabilities (average 0.0051) than configurations where X
is a seller (average 0.000046). The large difference in closure prob-
abilities is due to the fact that triads with middle buyers primarily
consist of two buyers and one seller, with the required third edge
being a buyer-seller edge. In contrast, triads with middle sellers
likely contain one seller and two buyers, with the required third
edge being a buyer-buyer edge. Since the Taobao network is essen-
tially a bipartite network of buyers and sellers, buyer-seller edges
occur much more often than buyer-buyer edges, leading to triadic
closure for buyers being over 100 times more likely than for sellers.
Triad-Closing Edge Type Distribution. After computing the in-
stance counts and triad-closing probabilities of each Directed Con-
figuration Set, we next examine the distribution of edge types clos-
ing each type of configuration. For each of the 16 configurations ci,
we count the number of instances that are closed by messages and
trades in each direction. Column P(m|close) of Table 3 shows that
messages close most of the triads in the network. However, mes-
sages are also approximately 3 times as common as trade edges in
the data. Therefore, we need to compute expectations for each of
the 4 possible triad-closing edge types (mi, mo, ti, and to).
We define a node’s generative baseline as the proportion of its
out-edges that are trades. We assume that when a node A creates
an edge, it generates a trade edge with a probability equal to its
generative baseline, denoted by pt(A). For the configuration ci, the
expected number of triads that are closed by a trade from U to V is
equal to
∑
U∈ci
pt(U), where the summation is over all instances
of the configuration ci. Similarly, the expected number of triads
that are closed by a trade from V to U is
∑
V ∈ci
pt(V ). View-
ing each instance of edge generation as a separate Bernoulli trial,
we derive an expression for surprise [20] to indicate the number of
signed standard deviations by which an observed edge type count
differs from expected. For the configuration ci, the surprise of the
triad-closing edge (U,V) being a trade is sto =
#observed−
∑
U∈ci
pt(U)√∑
U∈ci
[pt(U)∗(1−pt(U))]
, where #observed is the number of instances of ci that are closed
by a trade edge (U,V). Similarly, we compute the surprise sti of the
triad-closing edge (V,U) being a trade. These trade surprise values
are listed in Columns s(to), s(ti) of Table 3.5
After computing these edge type surprises, we can compare ob-
served triad-closing edge counts with expected edge counts from
our generative baseline. Our first observation regarding directed
edge surprises is that for configurations where X is a buyer, the
triad-closing edge being a trade edge is observed significantly more
than expected, as shown in Table 3. An explanation for this is that
configurations with middle buyers primarily consist of two buyers
and one seller, with the required third edge being a buyer-seller
edge. Since Taobao is essentially a bipartite network, trade sur-
prises for such configurations vary from 40 to 140 standard devia-
tions more than expected.
For configurations where X is a buyer and only one of U and V
is a seller, s(to) and s(ti) differ by a factor of 2. In particular, the
trade surprise of the edge directed toward the seller is twice as large
as the other direction. This is an example of how the role of each of
the nodes in a configuration influence both the edge type and edge
direction probabilities of the triad-closing third edge.
In contrast, for configurations where X is a seller, both trade
surprises, s(to) and s(ti), are negative. As previously mentioned,
when X is a seller, U and V are likely to be both buyers. Since
buyers rarely purchase from each other on Taobao, this leads to
messages being observed more than expected between U and V .
Our analysis of edge type surprises indicates the significance of
user roles in dictating edge formation in the Taobao network. Mes-
sage edges close the majority of the triads in Taobao due to their
relative proportion among all network edges. However, the relative
proportion of triad-closing edges being a message edge is primarily
dictated by the user role of the middle node X .
5We do not explicitly compute the surprises for directed message
edges since pm(X) = 1−pt(X), implying that s(mo) = -s(to) and
s(mi) = -s(ti).
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5. PRICE OF TRUST
The prior study of information passing relies upon the spread of
influence through buyer-buyer communication, which can be seen
as an implicit form of buyer-buyer trust. We next examine a more
explicit form of buyer-seller trust encapsulated by seller ratings.
In the context of electronic marketplaces, buyers are unsure about
seller trustworthiness, so buyers put their trust into seller ratings
and reviews, and are willing to pay a premium to sellers with good
reputations [26]. How much extra will a buyer pay for transaction
with a highly rated seller?
Data Preparation. To answer this question, we use the large Taobao
transaction dataset to study how good seller reputations are re-
warded on Taobao and quantify a price for trust. To facilitate our
experiments, we perform a web crawl of the Taobao website to ob-
tain product and seller metadata associated with the transactions
in our original dataset. Each transaction in Taobao is rated by the
buyer, so we use the percentage of positive reviews that each seller
has received in the past as a proxy for seller reputation and trust-
worthiness. Henceforth, we shall refer to that ratio as seller rating.
With this rating information, we compare sellers of the same
product and determine how their sale prices differ. The difficult
step of the experimental setup is identification of all product list-
ings in our dataset which correspond to the same products. We
develop a high precision method targeted toward specific types of
products and use our method to identify and group together prod-
uct listings referring to the same product into product clusters. The
resulting dataset for our study of trust consists of 382,980 items,
11,293 product clusters (corresponding to unique product types),
and 6,199 unique sellers. Each of these product clusters contains a
set of items which correspond to the same exact product.
Figure 7: Buyer-Seller Cluster. Given that S1 and S2 both sell
exactly the same product that the buyers buy, predict the cor-
rect seller for each buyer B1, B2, B3.
Quantifying Trust. With our product cluster dataset, we study the
relationship between seller rating and the price at which a seller can
transact. For each product cluster, for each listing within a cluster,
we compute % deviation from median cluster price. We plot the av-
erage price deviation from the median per listing versus seller rat-
ing in Figure 5, and fit the data with a power function (R2 of 0.80).
From the super-linear fit, we see that a higher rating is associated
with a seller selling his products at a premium compared to most of
his peers. Another interesting observation is that a seller rating of
97.1% corresponds to transaction at the median cluster price. The
lack of negative reviews in such data has been observed in other
e-commerce data such as eBay [25], and has been hypothesized to
be the result of a “high-courtesy” social norm.
Next, we aggregate the average price difference of all items sold
by a seller and plot that against seller rating, shown in Figure 6. The
primary difference between this plot and the previous one is that we
now aggregate all the different instances of a seller’s transactions
within the same cluster, and compare the sellers in a cluster against
each other.6 We find that a power function fits our data particularly
well (R2 of 0.87). Looking across all sellers, the elasticity of prod-
uct price with respect to seller rating is a small, positive quantity,
indicating that there is a direct relationship between seller rating
and increased sales price.
One possible explanation for our findings is that highly rated sell-
ers incur higher costs associated with their products, hence they can
sell their products at a price premium. For example, highly rated
sellers may provide better services, such as replying to messages
from customers in a timely fashion, or shipping products more fre-
quently. An alternative explanation is that buyers are willing to
pay more to highly rated sellers to minimize transaction risk, thus
sellers who maintain good reputations are financially rewarded. Al-
though higher seller ratings are correlated with higher sales prices,
the small magnitude of the elasticity indicates that buyer purchas-
ing decisions are likely influenced by other variables, such as the
social network in which the purchases are embedded. This leads us
to consider the scenario of consumer choice prediction.
6. CONSUMER CHOICE PREDICTION
In order to demonstrate the power of network structure, we now
consider the problem of consumer choice prediction. Imagine the
following situation: a user comes to Taobao and issues an exact
query for the product (s)he aims to buy. There is a list of k sellers
selling the exact product the buyer is going to buy. Which seller
will the buyer purchase the item from? The seller with the lowest
price? The most trusted seller? The seller who interacted with the
buyer’s friends in the past?
6There is large variation between activity levels among different
sellers, so we only display those who have sold at least 15 items.
Given that our prior experiments have demonstrated the impor-
tance of the social network and the strong presence of information
passing, we aim to investigate the role that social and communica-
tion networks play in consumer decision making [5]. If the social
network has no influence upon buyer behavior, then we expect that
buyers will purchase from sellers that offer the lowest price. How-
ever, as we will see, it is exactly the social network information
that gives the strongest signal in predicting which seller a buyer
will make a purchase from.
For this consumer choice prediction task, we use the product
cluster data described previously in our study of trust. Each prod-
uct cluster consists of a set of transactions between different pairs
of people, but corresponding to the exact same product. We convert
each product cluster into a bipartite subgraph composed of buyer
and seller nodes, as shown in Figure 7, where the buyers and sellers
have all either bought or sold the same particular product. We will
term these bipartite subgraphs buyer-seller clusters, and henceforth
shall perform prediction with these clusters.
Typically a seller will transact with multiple buyers in the same
cluster, while a buyer purchases the product from a single seller in
the cluster. Both buyers and sellers can be included in more than
one buyer-seller cluster if they buy or sell multiple types of prod-
ucts. We restrict our focus to buyer-seller clusters with at least 2
and no more than 10 sellers. Overall, our prediction data is com-
posed of 9,950 clusters, with a per-cluster average of 5.91 buyers
and 3.l3 sellers. It is important to understand that, by construc-
tion, all sellers offer a product for sale that is exactly relevant to the
buyer’s interests. The task now is, within a cluster, given a particu-
lar buyer, rank the sellers such that the seller the buyer is going to
buy from is ranked as high as possible.
Problem Statement: For each buyer-seller clusterCi, there is an
associated set Bi of buyers and set Si of sellers. For each cluster
Ci, for each buyer Bij in Bi, predict which seller(s) from Si the
buyer Bij will purchase their product(s) from.
We model this prediction problem as a ranking problem, where
for each buyer Bij in cluster Ci, we wish to generate a ranking of
the sellers Sik, such that the true seller from whom Bij actually
purchased the product has the highest rank (i.e., score). Since the
positive and negative examples for our problem come in sets, it
is natural to use a ranking based machine learning approach. In
particular, we use the Support Vector Machine SVM-rank [16].
For consumer choice prediction, we use a base set of 23 features
that describe product, buyer and seller metadata. We also use fea-
tures that describe the buyer-seller interactions and network struc-
ture. Table 4 lists the features we use in our experiments, along
with the networks they are computed on.7
Experimental Setup and Evaluation. Our data consists of 58,812
sets of training examples (i..e, buyer-seller pairs where a buyer can
buy the same product from multiple sellers). We split the data into
75% train and 25% test sets. The SVMs were trained with linear
kernels and loss functions were chosen to minimize the number of
incorrect constraints. Since we typically have one positive example
per buyer decision, this is equivalent to optimizing Precision@1.
As a point of comparison for our models, we construct three sim-
ple rule-based baselines:
• Random baseline - rank the sellers randomly
•MinPrice baseline - rank the sellers by increasing price.
•MostMsg baseline - rank the sellers by decreasing buyer-seller
message volume. Defaults to Random if no message edge is present.
7For each buyer decision, network features are computed from the
snapshot of the network which existed the day prior to the true pur-
chase date. This is necessary to properly model buyer decisions.
Feature Set P@1 MRR MR
All Features 0.56 0.72 2.00
Only Network 0.55 0.72 2.02
Only Meta 0.33 0.57 2.62
Meta + Msgs 0.50 0.69 2.13
Meta + Trades 0.43 0.64 2.34
Meta + Contacts 0.42 0.63 2.40
Meta + Direct 0.56 0.72 2.00
Meta + Indirect 0.34 0.58 2.58
MostMsg 0.50 0.69 2.11
Random 0.31 0.53 2.90
MinPrice 0.29 0.54 2.77
Table 5: Customer choice prediction results.
We evaluate the models and baselines using the following three
metrics:8
• Precision at Top 1 (P@1) - Fraction of times that the top
ranked seller is actually the true seller. (Higher is better)
•Mean Rank (MR)- Average Rank of the true seller. (Lower is
better)
• Mean Reciprocal Rank (MRR) - Average Reciprocal Rank
( 1Rank ) of the true seller. (Higher is better)
Experimental Results. Table 5 gives an overview of our experi-
mental results where we compare the models using various feature
sets and the baselines. First, we note that the model trained on all
23 features gives a 79% improvement over the P@1 of the Random
baseline and a 38% improvement over Random’s MRR. The model
also gives a 13% improvement over the MostMsg baseline and a
93% improvement over the MinPrice baseline. For all our evalu-
ation metrics, the model displays significantly better performance
than the 3 baselines. It is interesting to note the poor performance
of MinPrice compared to MostMsg. This suggests that commu-
nication links and the social graph are essential to understanding
how consumers make purchasing decisions in social commerce net-
works. Note that a natural explanation for the importance of the
social graph can be that a buyer first messages a seller, then imme-
diately trades with him. However, we control for this by discarding
all communication on and after the trade date.
To evaluate prediction performance in more detail, we graph
the P@1 and MRR of the Full model (labeled as SVM) and the
3 baselines versus the number of sellers in the buyer-seller cluster
(i.e., how many different sellers a buyer can choose from) in Fig-
ures 8(a),(e). As expected, the performance of all models and base-
lines decreases as the number of sellers in the cluster increases. Ob-
serve that the performance gap between the Full model and MostMsg,
the strongest baseline, widens as the number of sellers to choose
from increases and prediction becomes more difficult. If we look at
the proportional P@1 improvement of the Full model over MostMsg,
we see only a 4.5% improvement when there are 2 sellers, but a
39.5% improvement when there are 10 sellers. In particular, we
would like to highlight the Full model’s strong P@1 of 42.1% for
the challenging prediction task with 10 sellers. In general, the full
power of the model is not realized until the prediction problem be-
comes difficult for simple rule-based heuristics.
Different Feature Sets. Having constructed a successful predic-
tive model, we now ask, “What features are most valuable when
modeling consumer choice?” In the following set of experiments,
we contrast the performance of SVM models trained on different
sets of graph and metadata features in order to better understand
how consumers make purchasing decisions.
8Performance was also evaluated with several other standard rank-
ing metrics. Results are similar, so hence not displayed.
Feature Type Feature Name Feature Description T M C
Product Metadata Features
Fractional Price Rank Seller ranking using their median product price
Fractional Rating Rank Seller ranking using their rating percentage
Historical Sold Num. of all products sold by seller. 1) fractional rank 2) log of value
Inventory Sold Quantity already sold in the particular product listing.
Insurance If the product is insured by the seller
Direct Network Features
Buyer-Seller Interactions 1) Trade volume 2) Message volume 3) Are they contacts? X X X
Time Since Last Transaction Computed for both message and trade networks X X
Fractional Message Rank Seller ranking using number of buyer-seller messages X
Nodal Trade Volumes Number of trades for buyer and seller in the 2 month observation period X
Indirect Network Features
Number of mutual partners Number of nodes who have messaged or transacted with both buyer and seller X X
Seller Clustering Coefficients Computed for both message and contact networks X X
Mutual Densities Frac. of edges between the set of nodes mutual with both buyer and seller X X
Seller PageRanks Computed for static endtime networks X X X
Table 4: Feature Set. T, M, C denote if the feature is computed on the trade, message, and contact networks, respectively.
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(d) P@1: Graph vs Metadata
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Figure 8: Consumer choice prediction performance. The social graph is the most important feature in predicting which seller a
buyer will purchase from.
When doing prediction, are network features as valuable as meta-
data features such as product price and seller rating? We first com-
pare the performance of a SVM trained on network (graph) fea-
tures versus a SVM trained on metadata (seller profile and product
description) features. We find that the P@1 of the graph features
SVM is only slightly worse than the Full model, whereas the meta-
data features SVM is not much better than Random, as displayed
in Table 5. Most notably, there is a large performance gap between
the graph features SVM compared to the metadata features SVM,
as illustrated in Figures 8(d),(h). This implies that prediction using
only seller and product information is inadequate, the social and
trade networks in the neighborhood of the buyer and seller must be
taken into account. Buyers likely do not just use seller profile and
product information when making purchasing decisions.
Given that network features are essential when predicting con-
sumer choice, what type of network features are more valuable for
prediction: direct features or indirect features (i.e., clustering coef-
ficients, PageRanks)? For this experiment, we train SVM models
on direct and indirect network features, the different graph feature
classes we use are listed in Table 4. Note that when comparing
direct and indirect network features, we include all metadata fea-
tures in both sets. Figures 8(c),(g) illustrate the large performance
gap between the Meta + Direct SVM vs the Meta + Indirect SVM,
labeled as Direct and Indirect respectively in the figures. We ob-
serve that direct graph information provided by buyer-seller edges
is significantly more valuable than the collective information pro-
vided by other edges in the local neighborhoods. This is not sur-
prising because powerful information content is present in direct
edges. Historical buyer-seller message volume can be indicative of
an existing social relationship or historical product queries, while
historical buyer-seller trade volume can be indicative of customer
loyalty and trust with the seller.
Which network (contact, message, trade) is most useful for pre-
dicting consumer choice? In this section, we contrast SVM mod-
els trained on each of the separate Taobao networks. We include
all metadata features with each set of network features in this ex-
periment as well, prediction results are displayed in Table 5. The
performance of the 3 network feature sets versus the number of
sellers in the cluster are displayed in Figures 8(b),(f). Our experi-
ment demonstrates that the message network is the most valuable
network to utilize when predicting consumer choice. One possi-
ble explanation for this finding is that historical message volume is
an indicator of familiarity between buyer and seller, i.e., an exist-
ing trust relationship between buyer and seller. Historical message
volume can also indicate previous potential purchase interest.
We also observe that prediction with the trade network is slightly
better than that with the contact network. This suggests that cus-
tomer loyalty, the primary trade network feature we use, is a more
important indicator of consumer choice than the network of con-
tacts. Our explanation for this is that, inherently, contact links are
less valuable than trade or message links in such social networks.
It takes little effort to add someone to a friends list, as it is a one-
time operation. In contrast, maintaining a conversation requires an
investment of time and mutual interest on the part of both parties.
Forming a trade link is arguably the most costly as it requires cur-
rency and an actual transaction to make the connection.
Per-Category Performance. After performing prediction with a
single SVM ranking model, the next question to ask is, “Can we
perform better prediction through the use of multiple models?” To
answer this question, we segment all historical transactions in our
dataset into their respective product categories, and train separate
SVM ranking models for each category. The results of our model
testing are displayed as Aggregated in Figure 8(a),(e). As expected,
the aggregated performance of the category SVMs is slightly better
than the single Full SVM, with a P@1 of 0.58 compared to 0.56.
Our study of consumer choice prediction demonstrates that in so-
cial commerce sites such as Taobao, user communication and social
activity is the primary influence upon consumer choice. Utilizing
primarily social networking features, we are able to construct an
SVM model that can predict, for the case of a buyer choosing from
among 10 possible sellers, the correct seller 42% of the time, ap-
proximately 4 times better than random. When faced with a selec-
tion of substitute goods offered by different sellers, buyers will not
just choose their preferred seller through simple heuristics regard-
ing price or rating. We can imagine that buyers utilize many sources
of information (seller history, advice of friends, seller’s messages),
and each buyer processes the information in their own way in order
to make a personal purchasing decision. Although we cannot say
with certainty what buyers are thinking, we can definitively state
that the social graph in which the buyer and seller are embedded is
the best feature to look at when predicting consumer choice.
7. CONCLUSION
Our work analyzes the activities of one million users of the Chi-
nese social commerce site Taobao. Through the study of directed
closure rules, we empirically verify that implicit information pass-
ing is present in the Taobao network, and show that communica-
tion between buyers is a fundamental driver of purchasing activ-
ity. We then investigate the directed triadic closure process and
explain how link formation is highly dependent upon the distribu-
tion of buyer/seller roles for the nodes of a social commerce net-
work. Third, we use Taobao review data to demonstrate how high
seller ratings are associated with product price premiums, and thus
quantify a price for trust. Finally, we develop a machine learning
model to accurately predict consumer choice, and demonstrate that
the social network is the most important feature in predicting how
consumers choose their transaction partners.
We hope that our study will motivate future research into so-
cial shopping, as well as give impetus to established e-commerce
companies to add more social networking features. Future areas
of related study include: analysis of user browsing data to develop
refined consumer choice models for social commerce, study of in-
formation passing while factoring in both buyer-buyer and buyer-
seller trust relationships, and viral marketing to influence consumer
choice in social commerce.
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